Cybersecurity: Ideas Whose Time Has Not Come -- and Shouldn't by Nojeim, Gregory T.
I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY FOR THE INFORMATION SOCIETY
Cybersecurity: Ideas Whose Time Has Not
Come-and Shouldn't
GREGORY T. NOJEIM*
Cybersecurity is a serious problem that Congress and the
Executive Branch need better to address. Ideas about how to address
this problem abound and are being put into legislation that members
of Congress are eager to advance. Some are obviously needed, have
little downside, and should have been enacted years ago. But, a
surprisingly large handful cut the wrong way; while well-intentioned,
these ideas for statutory changes to deal with the significant
cybersecurity problems we face could backfire and make us less
secure. Unlike administrative initiatives adopted entirely within the
discretion of the executive branch-and which can be revised or
repealed just as easily-policy choices embodied in statutes can be
revised only through subsequent legislation, making such decisions
very difficult to reverse even when their negative impact becomes
apparent. Some would undermine cybersecurity instead of furthering
it.
The negative effects of these policy proposals can be broken down
into five categories:
(i) an unexpected economic or systematic impact;
(ii) poor decisions that result from moving the power to
decide away from the best decision-maker;
(iii) slowing down decision-making or information
sharing necessary to making the right decision;
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(iv) creating perverse incentives; and
(v) endangering civil liberties.
This paper identifies some of the most problematic cybersecurity
policy ideas, explains how they could backfire, and offers in each case
an alternative approach that could accomplish the goals of the policy
proposal called into question. It explores proposals to: (i) empower
the government to block or limit Internet communications on private
networks; (ii) give the Department of Defense the lead cybersecurity
role for civilian government and privately owned critical
infrastructure information systems; (iii) have the government monitor
private networks and communications for cybersecurity reasons; and
(iv) increase the scope of what is lawful electronic surveillance by re-
architecting new communications technologies and services to make
them more wiretap ready. Each of these proposals would unjustifiably
increase the federal government's ability to take unilateral action in
networks otherwise (and more appropriately) subject to highly
distributed governance.
I. PROPOSAL 1: EMPOWER THE GOVERNMENT TO BLOCK OR LIMIT
INTERNET COMMUNICATIONS ON PRIVATE NETWORKS
Probably the most talked about cybersecurity measure in any
legislative proposal is the "Internet Kill Switch"-governmental power
to shut down or limit Internet traffic in an emergency. Giving the
government kill switch authority would generate virtually all of the
negative effects that characterize cybersecurity ideas that should be
rejected. It would move the shut down decision away from the
network operators who are the best decision-makers, slow decisions
about whether to shut down a network, discourage network operators
from sharing information with the government, create perverse
incentives that undermine cybersecurity, and threaten civil liberties.
The "Internet Kill Switch" was first associated with the
Cybersecurity Act of 2009. Section 18(2) of the bill as introduced
would have empowered the President to declare a "cybersecurity
emergency" and limit or shut down Internet traffic to any
compromised system or network in the emergency.' Section 18(6) of
1 Section 18(2) of the bill provided that the President "may declare a cybersecurity
emergency and order the limitation or shutdown of Internet traffic to and from any
compromised ... critical infrastructure information system .... " Cybersecurity Act of
2009, S.773, 111th Cong. § 18(2) (as introduced, Apr. 1, 2009).
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the bill as introduced went further: It gave the President the power "to
order the disconnection of any . . . critical infrastructure information
system[] or network[] in the interest of national security . . . ."2
Proponents argue that critical infrastructure operators' decisions to
isolate their systems would be influenced inappropriately by pursuit of
profit and fear of liability, instead of by protection of national security.
They also argue that because the Internet has no "kill switch" the
legislation cannot be interpreted to authorize the President to flip the
switch.
However, the network "backbones" of major Internet providers are
generally regarded as "critical infrastructure" because their disruption
would have enormous and immediate economic effects. Though the
Internet has no "kill switch," if the President could shut down or limit
Internet traffic to Internet backbone systems, he could, in effect, order
significant elements of the Internet and significant amounts of
Internet traffic to be shut down. When the government of Egypt did
exactly that in early 2011-cutting off much of its population from
Internet access for days during civil unrest-it magnified concerns in
the U.S. about legislation that would extend such power to the
President.3
The idea that the government should have the authority to shut
down or limit Internet traffic in a cybersecurity emergency lives on in
the comprehensive cybersecurity legislation introduced in the next
Congress, the Cybersecurity and Internet Freedom Act (CIFA). 4
Concerned with distancing their bill from Egypt's actions, CIFA's lead
sponsors included a provision that states that "'neither the President.
. . or any officer or employee of the United States Government shall
have the authority to shut down the Internet"'5 and they released
statements indicating that the Act would "explicitly prevent the
President from shutting down the Internet" 6 and denying that their
2 Id. § 18(6).
3 Matt Richtel, Egypt Cuts OffMost Internet and Cell Service, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2011, at
A13, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/29/technology/internet/
29cutoff.html.
4 Cybersecurity and Internet Freedom Act of 2011, S. 413, 112th Cong. (2011).
s Id. § 2(C).
6 Press Release, S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 112th Cong.,
Lieberman, Collins, Carper Introduce Bill to Address Serious Cyber Security Threats (Feb.
17, 2011), available at http://www.hsgac.senate.gov,/subcommittees/federal-financial-
management/majority-media/-lieberman-collins-carper-introduce-bill-to-address-
serious-cyber-security-threats.
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legislation was ever intended to "'empower the President to deny U.S.
citizens access to the Internet."'7
But the bill nonetheless retains a vaguely worded provision that
enhances the government's authority over the Internet and that
authorizes the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), in an
emergency, to shut down some elements of the Internet or to curb
some Internet communications without adequate clarity and
limitations. Despite the disclaimer of any authority to "shut down the
Internet," the open-ended emergency provision is problematic both
for civil liberties and for owners and operators of the critical
infrastructure that could be put under an emergency order.
Specifically, the CIFA would empower the President to declare a
"cyber emergency"8 that triggers authority in the DHS to "direct" the
owners and operators of "covered critical infrastructure" to implement
response plans approved by the government. 9 DHS is also authorized
to "develop and coordinate" unspecified emergency measures
"necessary to preserve the reliable operation" of covered critical
infrastructure.o There is little doubt that the emergency powers that
DHS would possess under the bill when the President declares a
cybersecurity emergency include authority to shut down or limit
Internet traffic. This is clear because the bill specifically calls out, and
limits, this authority."1
7 Press Release, S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 112th Cong.,
Lieberman, Collins, Carper Statement on Cybersecurity (Feb. 1, 2011), available at
http://1ieberman.senate.gov/index.cfm/news-events/news/2011/2/lieberman-collins-
carper-statement-on-cybersecurity.
8 Cybersecurity and Internet Freedom Act, supra note 5, § 249(a)(1). The bill authorizes
the President to declare a cybersecurity emergency when there is an action by an individual
or an entity that has the capability and intent to exploit a "cyber risk" that could disrupt a
computer or software or hardware that is essential to the operation of covered critical
infrastructure. Id. A "cyber risk" is any physical or virtual risk to a computer or related
hardware or software, which, if exploited, would pose a significant risk of disruption to a
computer, hardware, or software essential to the reliable operation of covered critical
infrastructure. Id. § 241(5).
9 Id. § 249(a)(3)(A).
10 Id. § 249(a)(3)(B). The emergency actions DHS can direct must represent the least
disruptive means feasible to the operations of covered critical infrastructure and hardware
and software essential to the operation of covered critical infrastructure. Id. §§
249(a)(3)(C), 4(8).
11 Under the CIFA, communications traffic flowing over an Internet backbone system (or
other critical infrastructure system) can be restricted or shut down when a DHS official
determines that no other emergency measure will preserve the reliable operation of a
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Of course, the Internet has no "kill switch" for the U.S. President
to flip. Executing an Egypt-style Internet shut down in the U.S. to
squelch dissent would be difficult to accomplish anyway. As compared
to Egypt, the U.S. has significantly more Internet Service Providers
(ISPs) and backbone systems, and many more connection points to
the rest of the world, making it harder as a practical matter for the
government here to achieve blanket compliance with an order that
seemed politically motivated or otherwise illegal.12
Kill switch issues aside, is it wise to give the government authority
to shut down or limit parts of the Internet or to selectively control
communications over the Internet in an emergency? The Obama
Administration seemed to think it unnecessary because it omitted any
such authority from its cybersecurity legislative package, dealing the
proposal a significant blow. 13 Additionally, there are ample reasons to
reject such a proposal on the merits:
Unintended economic and systematic impacts: The potential list
of unintended consequences to both the economy and to critical
infrastructures themselves from even a limited shut down of some
Internet traffic is long. Depending on the network involved, a shut
down order could interfere with the flow of billions of dollars
necessary for the daily functioning of the economy. It could deprive
doctors of access to medical records. It could deprive manufacturers of
critical supply chain information. Even if the power were exercised
rarely, its mere existence would pose other risks. It could enable the
government to coerce costly and unwise-even unlawful-conduct by
threatening to shut down a system.
Moving decision-making away from the best decision-maker:
Owners and operators of critical infrastructure already have control
over their systems and strong financial incentives to protect them.
They already limit or cut off Internet traffic to particular systems
when they need to do so. They know better than government officials
whether their systems need to be shut down or isolated. So far, a real
computer or related hardware or software that is essential to the operation of covered
critical infrastructure. Id. § 249(a)(6)(a).
12 Joshua Gruenspecht, It Can't Happen Here? Why a Full-Scale American Internet
Blackout Is Unlikely, CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH. (Feb. 9, 2011), http://www.cdt.org/
blogs/joshua-gruenspecht/it-can't-happen-here-why-full-scale-american-internet-
blackout-unlikely.
13 For the Obama Administration's cybersecurity legislative package, see OFFICE OF MGMT.
& BUDGET, COMPLETE CYBERSECURITY PROPOSAL (2011), http://ww w.whitehouse.gov/omb/
legislativeletters.
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life circumstance has not yet been identified in which an owner or
operator of a critical system kept it running when it clearly needed to
be shut down. Government agencies' failures to date to protect their
own systemS14 give reason to question the assumption that underlies
the proposed authority: that the government knows best.
Perverse incentives: Giving the government the power to shut
down or limit Internet traffic even in limited circumstances would
backfire by creating perverse incentives. Private sector operators will
be reluctant to share information if they know the government could
use that information to order them to shut down. Shut down authority
would thus undermine the very information sharing that the CIFA
legislation encourages. Broadly speaking, it would also undermine the
partnership that must develop around cybersecurity between the
private sector and the government.
Slowing decision-making: Perhaps most importantly, giving the
government shut down authority during an emergency would
encourage delay when quick action is necessary. When private sector
network operators determine that shutting down a system would be
advisable, they could lose precious time waiting to be ordered to shut
down so that they would be less likely to be held liable for the damage
a shut down could cause others.15
Endangering civil liberties: Giving the government the power to
block some Internet communications in an emergency for legitimate
reasons creates a risk that such power will be abused or misused, to
the detriment of civil liberties. One misuse would be to shut down
some communications traffic to thwart a protest, as the government of
14 E.g., the Government Accountability Office recently found:
Weaknesses in information security policies and practices at 24 major
federal agencies continue to place the confidentiality, integrity, and
availability of sensitive information and information systems at risk.
Consistent with this risk, reports of security incidents from federal
agencies are on the rise, increasing over 650 percent over the past 5
years.
U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-137, INFORMATION SECURITY: WEAKNESSES
CONTINUE AMID NEW FEDERAL EFFORTS TO IMPLEMENT REQUIREMENTS (2011),
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/dl2137.pdf.
15 Limitations on liability for compliance with cybersecurity mandates permeate various
legislative proposals. For example, CIFA provides that no civil action that is the direct
consequence of actions taken in good faith to implement emergency cybersecurity
measures may be maintained against an entity that owns or operates a critical
infrastructure system. Cybersecurity and Internet Freedom Act, supru note 5, § 249(e)(4).
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Egypt did, and as the Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) system in San
Francisco did. On August 11, 2011, BART shut down mobile phone
service in a number of underground stations in an effort to head off a
protest against an earlier shooting by BART police. 16 The normal
restraint on government action in this context-judicial review to
protect civil liberties-is often ineffective because it comes after the
emergency that triggered the restrictions on communications.
Alternative approach: While the government often does not know
best, sometimes it does know a key piece of information that the
private sector operator may lack that would influence a decision about
whether to isolate a system or throttle particular traffic. For example,
the National Security Agency (NSA) may learn from its own signals
surveillance activities of a concerted effort to attack one system that
may be a harbinger of an attack on another. A good alternative to
giving the government the authority to shut down traffic to the other
system would be to encourage the NSA to share the information with
the operators of the system so they can better protect it. When the
information is classified, it would be shared only with those operators
who are cleared to receive the classified information.17 It may also be
necessary for the government to share such information with the ISP
that carries communications to the network at risk. Personnel at each
entity may be required to obtain security clearances so they can
receive classified information that may be involved in such a sharing
arrangement.18
16 Michael Cabanatuan, BARTAdmits Halting Cell Service to Stop Protests, S.F.
CHRONICLE, Aug. 13, 2011, at A-1, http://articles.sfgate.com/2011-08-13/news/
29883195 1 bart-police-bart-service-downtown-san-francisco-stations. BART ultimately
adopted a policy that severely limits the circumstances in which officials could interrupt
mobile phone service on the BART system. Extraordinary Circumstances Only for Cell
Phone Interruptions, BAYAREA RAPID TRANSIT (Dec. 1, 2011), http://www.bart.gov/
news/articles/2o11/neWS20111201.aspx.
17 As an example of how this might work, the Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act
would require the Director of National Intelligence to establish procedures to allow
elements of the intelligence community to share information pertaining to network
vulnerabilities and threats with cleared individuals and with entities that the DNI has
determined can appropriately protect classified information. Cyber Intelligence Sharing
and Protection Act of 2011, H.R. 3523, 112th Cong. § 2(a) (2011).
i8 For discussion of a pilot program through which Defense Department entities share
classified cybersecurity information with communications service providers to help them
better protect information systems of companies in the defense industrial base, see infra
notes 54-59 and accompanying text.
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This approach would increase the likelihood of making good
decisions about whether to shut down or limit Internet traffic for
cybersecurity reasons. It would put the decision in the hands of the
network operators and owners who have the most knowledge about
whether a system needs to be isolated, remove the liability-related
disincentive to rapid decision-making, and diminish the risk that shut
down decisions will be made for illegitimate reasons, such as to
squelch speech. Moreover, it would rely on, rather than threaten, the
sharing of information necessary to make the right decision.
II. PROPOSAL 2: GIVE THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE THE LEAD
CYBERSECURITY ROLE FOR CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT AND CRITICAL
PRIVATE SYSTEMS
The DHS bears responsibility for securing civilian government
systems and for working with the private sector to secure networks
associated with critical infrastructure, such as power production,
generation, and distribution systems, and information technology and
telecommunications systems. 19 However, it has been repeatedly
criticized for failing to develop plans for securing key resources and
critical infrastructure,20 as required in the Homeland Security Act of
2002.21 President Obama's national security and homeland security
19 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 201(d)(5), 116 Stat. 2135, 2146
(2002).
20 See, e.g., U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-o6-lo87T, CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION: DHS LEADERSHIP NEEDED TO ENHANCE CYBERSECURITY
(2006), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/do61o87t.pdf. In 2008, GAO reported that the
DHS's U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team, which has significant responsibilities
for protecting private and governmental computer networks, was failing to establish a
"truly national capability" to resist cyber attacks. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-
08-588, CYBERANALYSIS AND WARNING: DHS FACES CHALLENGES IN ESTABLISHING A
COMPREHENSIVE NATIONAL CAPABILITY 47 (20o8), http://www.gao.gov/assets/28o/
279084.pdf. In 2009, GAO testified that DHS had "yet to comprehensively satisfy its ...
cybersecurity responsibilities ..... U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-o9-835T,
CYBERSECURITY: CONTINUED FEDERAL EFFORTS ARE NEEDED TO PROTECT CRITICAL SYSTEMS
AND INFORMATION (2009), http://wwx-.gao.gov/assets/130/122877.pdf. In 2010, GAO
found continued shortcomings. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-24,
CYBERSPACE POLICY: EXECUTIVE BRANCH IS MAKING PROGRESS IMPLEMENTING 2009 POLICY
REVIEW RECOMMENDATIONS, BUT SUSTAINED LEADERSHIP Is NEEDED (2010),
http://ww w.gao.gov/assets/320/31o967.pdf.
21 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002).
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advisors completed a cyberspace policy blueprint on April 17, 2009,22
but implementation of those measures was slowed by the
Administration's failure to timely appoint a cybersecurity official in
the White House who could drive policy development and coordinate
implementation of a government-wide plan.23
In the meantime, the NSA-an intelligence agency within the
Department of Defense (DOD)-has continued to develop its own
network monitoring capabilities and has worked to defend networks
containing classified information. In addition, the DOD has set up its
own Cyber Command to oversee the military's efforts to protect DOD's
own 15,000 computer networks.24 Cyber Command's top commander
also heads the NSA and it is housed at Fort Meade alongside the
NSA.25 Cyber Command became operational on May 21, 2010, pulling
together information operations expertise from components of the
Army, Navy, and Air Force, and launching a program to recruit a
cadre of cyber-warriors.26 In this environment-a plodding DHS and a
slowed-down White House, an emergent Cyber Command with
expertise, and a complex threat environment with many actors and
22 Exec. Office of the President of the U.S., Cyberspace Policy Review: Assuring a Trusted
and Resilient Information and Communication Infrastructure (2009), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/CyberspacePolicyReview-final.pdf.
23 Cybersecurity Coordinator Howard Schmidt was appointed on December 22, 2009.
Macon Phillips, Introducing the New Cybersecurity Coordinator, THE WHITE HOUSE BLOG
(Dec. 22, 2009, 7:3o AM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2009/12/22/introducing-
new-cybersecurity-coordinator.
24 U.S. Cyber Command Factsheet, UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND,
http://www.stratcom.mil/factsheets/Cyber Command (last visited Apr. 5, 2012). The
United States Cybercommand is subordinate to the U.S. Strategic Command and is
headquartered in Fort Meade, Maryland where NSA is also headquartered. Id. Its mission
statement, from the U.S. Strategic Command Factsheet:
USCYBERCOM is responsible for planning, coordinating, integrating,
synchronizing, and directing activities to operate and defend the
Department of Defense information networks and when directed,
conducts full-spectrum military cyberspace operations (in accordance
with all applicable laws and regulations) in order to ensure U.S. and
allied freedom of action in cyberspace, while denying the same to our
adversaries.
Id.
25 Id.
26 Id.
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interconnected networks that all need to be defended-it is tempting
to give Cyber Command and the NSA responsibility not only to defend
the .mil domain, but to take the lead in defending the civilian .gov
domain and privately-owned critical infrastructure systems as well.
This temptation to give the NSA and Cyber Command a lead role
in securing civilian government systems and leading the government's
efforts to help the private sector to secure private systems should be
resisted. NSA must follow, for legitimate reasons, a policy of secrecy
that is incompatible with the transparency necessary for the success of
a civilian cybersecurity program. DHS operates transparently relative
to the military agencies and issues some of the most informative
Privacy Impact Assessments (PIAs) in government, making many of
its operations more transparent than one might expect of a
governmental entity with national security responsibilities.27 If NSA,
Cyber Command, or a related DOD entity were to take the lead role in
cybersecurity for civilian unclassified systems, it would almost
certainly mean less transparency, less trust, and less corporate and
public participation, thereby increasing the likelihood of failure and
decreasing the effectiveness of the effort even in terms of security. It
would diminish needed information sharing and threaten civil
liberties.
Slowing Information Sharing: The vast majority of critical
infrastructure information systems are owned and operated by the
private sector, which also provides much of the hardware and software
on which government systems rely, including the government's
classified systems. The private sector has valuable information about
vulnerabilities, exploits, patches, and responses. Private sector
operators may hesitate to share this information if, as a result of the
secrecy that often attends defense and intelligence matters, they do
not know how it will be used and whether it will be shared with
competitors. The public-private partnership upon which the U.S.
cybersecurity strategy depends cannot function without trust. A lack
of transparency undermines trust and has hampered cybersecurity
efforts to date.
Endangering civil liberties: For other reasons that go beyond
securing the cooperation and support of the private sector, openness
is an essential aspect of any national cybersecurity strategy. Without
transparency, there is no assurance that cybersecurity measures
27 Privacy Impact Assesments, DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., http://ww W.dhs.gov/files/
publications/editorial 0511.shtm (last visited Apr. 6, 2012).
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adequately protect privacy and civil liberties and adhere to Fair
Information Practices28 and due process principles.
Confidence that the NSA would adhere to these principles is
undermined by its conduct in the Terrorist Surveillance Program
(TSP) for approximately five years after the September 11, 2001
terrorist attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center. The
TSP 29 involved secret surveillance in the U.S. of people
communicating internationally when one party to the communication
was thought to be an agent of al Qaeda or an associated organization.
The surveillance, at least to the extent it targeted persons in the
United States, is widely thought to have been both unconstitutional
and unlawful warrantless surveillance under the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act (FISA).3o The program ended shortly after it was
exposed in the New York Times.31
Transparency is essential if the public is to hold the government
accountable for the effectiveness of its cybersecurity measures and for
any abuses that occur. Conversely, the absence of transparency
undermines public trust, arousing suspicions based on past conduct
that rules intended to protect privacy and civil liberties are not being
followed. As happened with the TSP, when such conduct is eventually
exposed, the entire program can be threatened.
Alternative approach: Rather than undermining security and
liberty by giving a DOD entity lead responsibility for securing civilian
government and privately-owned critical infrastructure information
systems, the Department of Homeland Security should play this role.
Resources that should be made available to DHS so it can be effective
go well beyond funding. Rather, its cybersecurity program should be
28 Fair Information Practices are a series of principles, based on the Privacy Act, intended
to protect informational privacy. For DHS's articulation of Fair Information Practice
Principles, see Privacy Policy Guidance Memorandum, DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC. (Dec. 29,
20o8), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy policyguide_2008-o.pdf.
29 See James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/16/politics/
16program.html?pagewanted= all.
30 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1871 (2006).
31 Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 30. Following exposure of the TSP, Congress enacted
legislation that strengthened the FISA requirement that intelligence surveillance of U.S.
targets generally requires a court order and permitted surveillance in the U.S. of targets
abroad with only blanket approval by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of the
procedures under which the surveillance is conducted. FISA Amendments Act of 2008,
Pub. L. No. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436 (2008).
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structured to draw on the information, expertise, and human
resources in DOD entities such as Cyber Command and the NSA.
Steps are already being taken toward this end. On September 27,
2010, DHS and DOD signed a Memorandum of Understanding setting
forth the terms by which they would provide personnel, equipment,
and facilities to increase inter-departmental collaboration, and
support and synchronize each other's cybersecurity operations. 32
Under the agreement, DHS personnel go to the NSA to plan and
collaborate on cybersecurity activities, learn about detecting threats,
and bring with them expertise on civil liberties matters. 33 In turn, NSA
personnel, such as cryptologists and other professionals go to the DHS
network operations center to assist with cybersecurity operations.34
NSA experts would work alongside DHS cybersecurity teams to help
bring those teams up to speed quickly.
This kind of arrangement is a better way to take advantage of
expertise and human resources in the DOD than is the alternative of
giving a DOD entity operational control over civilian systems. 35 If DHS
can operate with as much transparency as possible, consistent with its
cybersecurity mission, this approach promotes needed information
sharing and increases confidence that civil liberties are being
protected. Building up the civilian cybersecurity capability by
leveraging the expertise of the NSA can reduce pressure to put
elements of DOD in control of civilian cybersecurity efforts. Once DHS
has built the necessary expertise, the co-location of DHS and DOD
personnel can be replaced by information sharing from DOD to DHS
about cybersecurity threats, vulnerabilities, and attacks on an ongoing
basis.
32 Memorandum of Agreement Between the Dep't of Homeland Sec. and the Dep't of Def.
Regarding Cybersecurity, at 5 (Sept. 27, 2010), available at http://www.dhs.gov,/xlibrary/
assets/20101013-dod-dhs-cyber-moa.pdf.
33 Id. at 1-3.
34 Id. at 3-4.
35 Leslie Harris, DHS-NSA in Cybersecurity Swap: Success to Be Named Later,
HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 15, 2010), http://ww w.huffngtonpost.com/leslie-harris/
dhs-nsa-in-cybersecurity b_764289.html.
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III. PROPOSAL 3: HAVE THE GOVERNMENT MONITOR PRIVATE
NETWORKS TO PROTECT THEM FROM MALWARE
This idea is so politically radioactive that it is seldom advocated
openly and starkly. Some, however, insist that because the
government has both cybersecurity expertise and information about
threats, attacks, and attack signatures that the private sector lacks, the
government should monitor private communications for cybersecurity
reasons.36 They argue that such monitoring-if done only by machine
without a human ever seeing the traffic being monitored-would
survive Fourth Amendment scrutiny.37 As one Hill staffer said at a
cybersecurity briefing in 2011, if the government and the private
sector ISP would both be looking for the same types of problems and
have to engage in the same level of communications scrutiny, and the
government could do a better job, why not have the government
perform this task?38
Moving decision-making away from the best decision-maker: Of
course, this argument rests on the assumption that the government
could do a better job, but the government's record of securing its own
systems calls this assumption into question. 39 The privacy
implications of such monitoring are profound, particularly when, in a
time of crisis, there would be enormous pressure to dial up the
intrusiveness of the monitoring. Moreover, it also ignores a key
difference between governmental monitoring and the monitoring
done every day by providers in the private sector: consumer choice. In
one model, the government monitors communications whether the
user chooses to allow that or not. In the private sector arrangement,
the Internet user-whether as an individual or a company-makes a
choice, even if from a limited universe: the user chooses an ISP to
connect the user to the Internet. Sometimes that choice is driven in
part by the provider's ability to protect the network and the users of
the network. In a sense, users hire a company to perform this
monitoring for them.
36 See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531
(2005).
37 See, e.g., id.
38 Briefing on Cybersecurity White Paper, House of Representatives, Mar. 11, 2011.
39 Federal agencies have been slow to implement cybersecurity reforms recommended by
the Government Accountability Office. This has resulted in network vulnerabilities and
breaches. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 15.
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Mandatory governmental monitoring of private sector
communications networks can also undermine the public/private
partnership that must support any successful cybersecurity program.
Few network operators would be comfortable with mandated
governmental monitoring of their networks, particularly if security
concerns dictate that they are not informed of what the monitoring
governmental agency is doing with the data it collects. Such a program
would undermine the trust that must develop between the private
sector and the government.
Though unlikely to be mandated directly, governmental
monitoring of private communications could arise as: (A) an
unintended by-product of existing programs in place to monitor
communications to or from the government; (B) an intentional
extension of those programs to private-to-private communications; or
(C) an indirect result of voluntary or mandatory information sharing
from the private sector to the government for cybersecurity reasons.
Programs that amount to ongoing government surveillance of private-
to-private communications among consumers will backfire when
exposed to the light of day: Public reaction would be so negative that
the program would have to be abandoned even if it provided a security
benefit.40 Consequently, it is better to design cybersecurity monitoring
programs to ensure that they do not result in government monitoring
of private-to-private communications.
A. UNINTENDED SYSTEMATIC IMPACT FROM EINSTEIN'S MISTAKES
Each government agency already has in place a program to protect
its networks by monitoring communications that pass over them.
Einstein 2,41 an intrusion detection system, is designed to supplement
the information security efforts federal agencies already undertake.
According to a May 19, 2008 Privacy Impact Assessment42 and a
40 The surveillance of communications to or from a network supporting a nuclear power
plant or similar critical infrastructure would not raise the same level of concern.
41 Einstein 2 is the successor of the original Einstein program. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT EINSTEIN PROGRAM: COLLECTING, ANALYZING, AND SHARING
COMPUTER SECURITY INFORMATION ACROSS THE FEDERAL CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT (2004),
available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy pia-eisntein.pdf
[hereinafter EINSTEIN Program 20041.
42 DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR EINSTEIN 2 3 (2008),
available at http://wkNvA-w.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy-pia-einstein2.pdf.
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January 9, 2009 opinion of the DOJ Office of Legal Counsel, 43
Einstein 2 is being deployed at federal agency Internet Access Points.
It assesses network traffic against a pre-defined database of signatures
of malicious code and alerts the United States Computer Emergency
Readiness Team (US-CERT) to malicious computer code. US-CERT,
in turn, passes on to intelligence and law enforcement agencies
information it receives that would assist those agencies in carrying out
their statutory missions.44 While the signatures that Einstein assesses
are not supposed to include personally identifiable information (PII)
as defined by DHS, they do include Internet Protocol (IP) addresses
and the alerts that Einstein 2 generates for US-CERT may include
other PII.45 In addition to using attack signatures, Einstein 2 also
detects anomalous network traffic on a particular system and alerts
US-CERT to those anomalies.
A successor, Einstein 3, is being tested with an undisclosed ISP
and an undisclosed federal agency. It will have the added capability of
intercepting threatening Internet traffic before it reaches a
government system. According to the Privacy Impact Assessment
DHS issued in connection with these tests, 46 Einstein 3 will use
intrusion detection technology developed by the NSA and will adapt
threat signatures developed by NSA in the course of its foreign
intelligence work and by the DOD in connection with its information
43 Stephen G. Bradbury, Legal Issues Relating to the Testing, Use, and Deployment of an
Intrusion-Detection System (Einstein 2.0) to Protect Unclassified Computer Networks in
the Executive Branch, 33 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 1 (2009), available at
http://www.justice.gov/olc/20o9/e2-issues.pdf. The memo concludes that operation of
Einstein 2 does not violate the Constitution or surveillance statutes. Id. An August 14, 2009
opinion from the Obama Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel affirms that
conclusion. David J. Barron, Legality ofIntrusion-Detection System to Protect
Unclassified Computer Networks in the Executive Branch, 33 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 1, 1
(2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/Olc/2009/legality-of-e2.pdf.
44 EINSTEIN PROGRAM 2004, supra note 42, at 8-9.
45 EINSTEIN PROGRAM 2004, supra note 42, at 7. The PIA for Einstein 2 makes it clear
that, for example, Einstein 2 will collect an email address when the source of malicious
code it detects is attached to an email address. Id. Moreover, any "flow record" (a
specialized summary of a suspicious communication) that Einstein routinely generates will
generally include IP address and time stamp, which are widely regarded as personally
identifiable. Id.
46 DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE INITIATIVE THREE
EXERCISE (2010), available at http://www.dhs.gov/x1ibrary/assets/privacy/
priv acy-pia-nppd initiativ e3exercise.pdf [hereinafter INITIATIVE THREE EXERCISE].
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assurance mission.47 It will also use commercially available threat
signatures.48
Einstein 3 operates on the network of an ISP providing service to
the government instead of on the network of the federal agency that is
being protected. One critically important question 49 is whether
Einstein can reliably focus on communications with the government
to the exclusion of private-to-private communications passing over
the ISP's network. According to the Einstein 3 PIA, the participating
federal agency will provide IP addresses to the ISP, which will use
them to distinguish traffic to or from that agency from other traffic.5o
This is a logical, but by no means foolproof, method of identifying the
targeted traffic. IP addresses can be re-allocated and become
outdated. If Einstein were to mistakenly analyze private-to-private
communications, it would likely be conducting an unlawful
interception under the electronic surveillance laws.51
Alternative approach: The government has the power-and the
responsibility-to monitor its networks to prevent intrusions and
attacks and can contract that work out to an ISP. Thus, there is no
quarrel with Einstein per se, just a need to prevent mistaken
monitoring of communications that are not with a governmental
agency. An independent audit of Einstein to ensure that it is not
accessing private-to-private communications should be required to
assess the system and to prevent mistakes.
47 Id. at 2.
48 Id. at 11.
49 For a fuller listing of open questions about the Einstein Intrusion Detection System, see
CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH., EINSTEIN INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEM: QUESTIONS THAT
SHOULD BE ADDRESSED 3-6 (2009), available at http://ww w.cdt.org/security/
20090728_einstein-rpt.pdf.
50 INITIATIVE THREE EXERCISE, supra note 47, at 4.
51 The Wiretap Act prohibits interception of electronic communications without a court
order, and defines "intercept" as the acquisition of the contets of any wire, electronic, or
oral communication throught the use of any electronic, mechanical or other device. 18
U.S.C. § 2510(4) (1968). Section 336 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY 2010
requires reports to Congress about the privacy impact of Einstein and any other similar
cybersecurity programs as well as information about the legal authorities for the programs
and about any audits that have been conducted or are planned for the programs.
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-259, § 336, 124 Stat.
2654, 2689-92 (2010).
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B. ENDANGERING CIVIL LIBERTIES BY EXTENDING EINSTEIN
MONITORING TO PRIVATE COMMUNICATIONS
Deputy Secretary of Defense William Lynn III has advocated
extending the Einstein intrusion detection and prevention system
from the civilian government systems it now protects to privately-
owned networks through voluntary adoption by ISPs. 52 Einstein
monitoring, as mentioned above, includes both analyzing
communications to or from a governmental agency and reporting
information back to other governmental agencies. When it comes to
extending Einstein monitoring to private networks, and to private-to-
private communications, it is the backhaul of information-the flow of
information to US-CERT and then to intelligence and law
enforcement agencies-that triggers civil liberties concerns. A person
who is communicating with a government agency cannot complain
that the government is reading his communication. A person who is
not can. If extending Einstein to the private sector includes reporting
personally identifiable information back to US-CERT and on to
intelligence and law enforcement agencies, this backhaul function
threatens civil liberties and could violate the Electronic
Communication Privacy Act and the Fourth Amendment.53 It also
moves some network monitoring responsibility to the government and
away from the private sector network operators best able to perform
this task.
52 Defense Dept. Outlines New Infosec Approach: Cybersecurity Speech by DoD Deputy
Secretary William Lynn, Gov INFO SEC. (May 26, 2010), http://www.govinfosecurity.com/
articles.php?art id= 258o&opg=1.
53 Absent an exception (explained in some detail infra at footnotes 63-67 and surrounding
text), ECPA generally prohibits providers of electronic communication service from
disclosing to governmental entities communications content and information about
communications such as email logs revealing who communicated with whom, without a
court order. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-508, loo Stat.
1848 (1986). The most significant exception to this rule is that communications content
more than 18o days old can be obtained with a subpoena, but such content tends to be less
useful for cybersecurity operations. To the extent that the backhaul to the government
reveals communications content or other communications information protected by ECPA
against disclosure to the government without a court order, it violates the statute unless an
exception applies. For example, a provider's acknowledgment to the government that
particular content has passed over its network necessarily discloses that content to the
government. The Fourth Amendment analysis is similar, but for content only, as non-
content is generally regarded as unprotected by the Fourth Amendment. U.S. CONST.
amend. IV.
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Alternative approach: The government should share the
technology that powers Einstein and the cyber-attack signatures that
it has and that the private sector lacks. It should permit critical
infrastructure network providers to use this technology if they find it
superior to alternatives. To avoid the negative impact on civil liberties,
any extension of Einstein to the private sector should exclude the
backhaul reporting of PII to US-CERT and to intelligence and law
enforcement agencies. This approach would help private sector
network operators do what they are hired to do to monitor their
networks for malicious code, while protecting privacy. Instead of
directly monitoring communications, the government would be
equipping the private sector parties best able to perform this task.
One model for implementing this alternative approach can be seen
in the program the NSA recently launched to help large
communications service providers secure networks of defense
contractors in the Defense Industrial Base (DIB) Cyber Pilot. Under
this program, the DOD shares classified attack signatures and other
cybersecurity information with ISPs or with the DIB companies
themselves.54 They use this information to protect the DIB companies'
networks against intrusion. The initial pilot involved AT&T, Verizon,
and CenturyLink, working with fifteen DIB companies that included
Lockheed Martin, CSC, SAIC, and Northrup Gumman. 55 This
arrangement, whereby the NSA helps private sector companies defend
their own networks, is a far better solution56 than having NSA itself
access the communications traffic and apply classified signatures to
clean it.
The Pentagon recently decided to make the DIB Pilot permanent,
to extend it to other DIB companies, and to consider extending the
54 William J. Lynn III, The Pentagon's Cyberstrategy, One Year Later: Defending Against
the Next Cyberattack, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Sept. 28, 2011), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/
articles/683o5/william-j-lynn-iii/the-pentagons-cyberstrategy-one-year-later. See also
DEP'T OF DEF., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT (PIA) FOR THE DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE
(DIB) CYBER SECURITY/INFORMATION ASSURANCE ACTIVITIES 5 (2011), available at
http://dodcio.defense.gov/Portals/o/Documents/
DIB%20CS-IA%2oPIA FINAL signed 3 ojun2011 VMSS GGMR RC.pdf.
55 Ellen Nakashima, NSA Allies with Internet Carriers to Thwart Cyber Attacks Against
Defense Firms, WASH. POST, June 16, 2011, http://ww w.washingtonpost.com/national/
major-internet-service-providers-cooperating-with-nsa-on-monitoring-traffic/
2011/o6/07/AG2dukXH-print.html.
56 Jim Dempsey, Don't Mess with Success, CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH. (June 17, 2011),
http://www.cdt.org/blogs/jim-dempsey/dont-mess-success.
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pilot to other critical infrastructure sectors.57 Special attention should
be paid both to the types of critical infrastructure companies to which
the DIB Pilot would be extended and to the flow of information from
ISPs to DOD.58
C. ON-GOING INFORMATION SHARING AS A BACK-DOOR TO
GOVERNMENTAL MONITORING
There is a well-founded belief that information sharing is an
important aspect of any cybersecurity program. Different players in a
networked environment detect different threats and vulnerabilities at
different times and an exchange of information about them can help
all. There is also a perception that cybersecurity information sharing
as practiced is inadequate and there is some concern that the
provisions of the Wiretap ActS9 and the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act (ECPA) 60 are impediments to information sharing. Any
discussion of information sharing must begin with an assessment of
the information that must be shared, but that is not, and with an
understanding of the extent to which the law already allows
information to be shared.
Current law gives providers of communications services
substantial authority to monitor their own systems and to disclose to
governmental entities, and to their peers, information about cyber-
attack incidents for the purpose of protecting their own networks. In
particular, the federal Wiretap Act provides that it is lawful for any
57 Aliya Sternstein, Defense to Grow Industrial Base Cyber Program, DHS May Expand to
Other Programs, NEXTGOV (Sept. 19, 2011), http://www.nextgov.com/nextgov/
ng_2011O919_673o.php.
s8 Consent is the legal underpinning of the current pilot: The DIB company that is the
destination of a communication consents to its ISP sharing with the government the "hits"
the ISP observes on the attack signatures the government has provided. Like electronic
surveillance, this reporting discloses routing, addressing, and signaling information about
communications, and may disclose communications content. The recipient has consented
to this disclosure. A consent-based model might be appropriate for other critical
infrastructure entities, such as a company operating a nuclear power plant. However, if the
critical infrastructure company to be protected is itself a communications service provider
for Internet users at large, its consent to disclosure to the government does not bind its
users and its extraction of consent from its users through provisions tucked away in terms
of service would create grave civil liberties concerns.
59 Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (1968).
6o Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2006).
426 [Vol. 8:2
NOJEIM
provider of electronic communications service to intercept, disclose,
or use communications passing over its network while engaged in any
activity that is a necessary incident to the protection of the rights and
property of the provider. 61 This includes the authority to disclose
communications to the government or to another private entity when
doing so is necessary to protect the service provider's network.
Likewise, under the ECPA, a service provider, when necessary to
protect its system, can disclose stored communications 62 and
customer records 63 to any governmental or private entity. 64
Furthermore, the Wiretap Act provides that it is lawful for a service
provider to invite in the government to intercept the communications
of a "computer trespasser"65 if the owner or operator of the computer
authorizes the interception and there are reasonable grounds to
believe that the communication will be relevant to investigation of the
trespass. 66
These provisions do not authorize ongoing or routine disclosure of
traffic by the private sector to any governmental entity. To amend
them to broadly allow the routine disclosure of communications traffic
to the government for cybersecurity purposes would destroy the
promise of privacy in the Wiretap Act and ECPA. The privacy these
laws protect fosters the growth of the Internet and the economic
activity that depends on it. Gutting them could backfire by
discouraging the growth of technologies, such as cloud computing,
that rely on the privacy of communications.
The Obama Administration has advanced such a proposal. 67 It
envisions a sweeping information sharing regime that would override
61Id. at § 2511(2)(a)(i).
62 Id. at § 2702(b).
63 Id. at § 2702(C).
64 Another set of exceptions authorizes disclosure if "the provider, in good faith, believes
that an emergency involving danger of death or serious physical injury to any person
requires disclosure without delay of communications [or information] relating to the
emergency." 18 U.S.C. §§ 2702(b)(8), (c)(4) (2006).
65 A "computer trespasser" is someone who accesses a computer used in interstate
commerce without authorization. Id. at § 2510(21).
66 Id. at § 2511(2)(i).
67 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY CYBERSECURITY
AUTHORITY AND INFORMATION SHARING: LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL (2011), available at
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contrary provisions in every state or local law without exception to
permit any entity to share with a new collection center at DHS any
information the entity may have, including communications traffic, so
long as the information was shared for cybersecurity purposes. 68 It
would not matter how it was acquired and it would not matter how
use and disclosure would otherwise be restricted. Sharing entities
would only have to undertake "reasonable" efforts to strip out
identifying information that was irrelevant to the cybersecurity
purpose, thus permitting all relevant identifying information, and the
irrelevant identifiers that are difficult to filter out, to be shared.69 The
information sharing would be done under privacy rules yet to be
written. 70
Likewise, proposals to solve the information-sharing dilemma by
simply expanding government power to compel disclosure of privately
held data should be rejected, such as proposals to give a governmental
entity wide-ranging authority to access private sector data that is
relevant to cybersecurity threats and vulnerabilities. 71 Such an
approach would be dangerous to civil liberties and would undermine
the public-private partnership that needs to develop further around
cybersecurity. Collecting large quantities of sensitive information into
a common database can also undermine security because such a
database could, itself, become a target for hackers.
Alternative approach: Properly viewed, implemented, and
carefully controlled information sharing is an alternative to
governmental monitoring of private communications. It leaves the
monitoring responsibility where it belongs; with the private sector
system operators. It supplements their existing abilities by better
equipping them to do the monitoring that needs to be done. While
current law authorizes providers to monitor their own systems and to
disclose voluntarily communications and records necessary to protect
their own systems, there might be a need for a very narrow exception
to the Wiretap Act and ECPA that would permit disclosures about
http://ww w.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/legislative/letters/dhs-cybersecurity-
authority.pdf.
68 Id. at 8, 10.
69 Id. at 8.
70 Id. at 10.
71 For an example of such a proposal, see Cybersecurity Act of 2009, S. 773, 111th Cong. § 14
(2009) (as introduced, Apr. 1, 2009).
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specific attacks and malicious code on a voluntary basis. The
exception would have to be narrow so that routine disclosure of
Internet traffic to the government or other service providers remained
clearly prohibited.
IV. PROPOSAL 4: IMPOSE DESIGN MANDATES ON NEW
COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGIES TO FACILITATE ELECTRONIC
SURVEILLANCE
The Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act
(CALEA) 72 was enacted in 1994 to require telecommunications
carriers to design specific wiretapping capabilities into their networks.
In 2005, the FCC extended these requirements to providers of
broadband Internet access and interconnected Voice Over IP (VOIP)
services.73 Now, according to press accounts, 74 the FBI wants similar
requirements to be imposed on communications applications and
services. The Federal Bureau of Investigation, fearing that its
surveillance capabilities will be eroded by new communications
technologies, has floated the idea that those technologies should be
made subject to design mandates that would facilitate surveillance of
communications utilizing those technologies.75 Among others, the FBI
has mentioned Skype, which provides encrypted VOIP services, and
RIM, which makes the popular BlackBerry and offers the Blackberry
enterprise service to business customers.76 Apparently, they would be
compelled to design their services to ensure government access to
unscrambled communications.77
While this is not a cybersecurity proposal in its own right, the FBI
justifies the electronic surveillance its proposal would facilitate by
72 Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 47 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010
(1994).
73 In the Matter of Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act and Broadband
Access and Services, 20 FCC Rcd. 14989 (2005), available at http://ww W.askcalea.net/
archiv es/docs/20050923-fcc-o5-153.pdf.
74 Charlie Savage, U.S. Tries to Make It Easier to Wiretap the Internet, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
27, 2010, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/o9/27/US/27wiretap.html.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Id.
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arguing, among other things, that it helps the FBI combat identity
theft78 that is a product of data breaches that result from cybersecurity
failures and would also help it combat other crimes. However, there is
a risk that the vulnerabilities that would have to be built into
communications technologies and services under such a mandate to
facilitate law enforcement surveillance could be exploited by identity
thieves, hackers, foreign spies, and foreign governments seeking
competitive advantage. In other words, this policy proposal to
enhance surveillance capabilities could backfire by undermining
cybersecurity at the same time enormous efforts are being made to
improve it.
This initiative is part of a program the FBI calls "Going Dark," so
named out of concern that as communications technologies evolve,
the FBI will be unable to listen in. In reality, the digital age has been a
boon for government surveillance. As cell phones and the Internet
have become deeply entwined in consumers' daily lives, more and
more personal and proprietary data is being transmitted and stored
on digital services, ranging from location, to one's associations,
purchases, and online interests. Electronic surveillance is already at
record levels and it is increasing. In 2010, 3,194 federal and state
wiretaps were authorized for criminal purposes, more than in any
prior year, 79 and an additional 1,506 intelligence intercepts were
authorized in 2010.80 On average in 2010, 3,199 communications were
intercepted in every criminal wiretap, yet 81% of monitored
communications were non-incriminating, according to the
government's own data."' At the same time, the legal restraints on
surveillance have been steadily relaxed-especially since the
78 See, e.g., The Electronic Communications Privacy Act: Government Perspectives on
Protecting Privacy in the Digital Age: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
112th Cong. 3, (2011) (statement of James A. Baker, Associate Deputy Att'y Gen., stating
that electronic surveillance laws protect privacy by helping law enforcement obtain
evidence used to prosecute privacy related crimes such as identity theft and hacking).
79 ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, WIRETAP REPORT 2010 31 tbl. 7 (2011), available at
http://ww w.uscourts.gov/Statistics/WiretapReports/WiretapReport20lO.aspx
[hereinafter 2010 WIRETAP REPORT].
80 Dep't of Justice, Office of Legislative Affairs, Annual Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act Report to Congress 2010 (2011), available at http://wwx.Wjustice.gov/nsd/foia/
readingroom/2o1ofisa-ltr.pdf (letter from Ronald Weich, Assistant Attorney General, to
Joseph Biden, President, United States Senate, dated Apr. 29, 2011).
81 2010 WIRETAP REPORT, supra note 8o, at 31 tbl. 7.
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September 11 attacks. Examples include the 2001 PATRIOT Act,82 the
2008 FISA Amendments Act,83 and the steady addition of relatively
minor crimes to the list of offenses for which wiretapping is permitted.
Unintended systematic impacts: Such a mandate could backfire in
several ways.84 First, it could stifle innovation because it would apply
to the application layer of the Internet, where the greatest innovation
and economic development are occurring. The next great application
might never be built because an innovator working with limited
resources would be hard pressed to meet the design mandate. Some
current applications would have to change so drastically that they
would become unrecognizable to current users and others might be
outlawed altogether. Second, it could undermine U.S. competitiveness
by spurring innovators to market their new products overseas, instead
of in the U.S., so they could avoid the mandate. Third, it would be
cited by foreign countries that are human rights abusers as a
justification for their own surveillance design mandates, which would
be used to monitor dissidents and thwart democratic movements,
undermining U.S. policy abroad.
Perhaps most important, the FBI proposal might actually harm
cybersecurity. In essence, the FBI is asking that applications have a
built-in backdoor to facilitate government wiretapping. However, such
backdoors can also be exploited by hackers and identity thieves. More
backdoors means less secure networks.
At Congressional hearings85 on the FBI's Going Dark program, the
cyber-insecurity that could result from such a mandate became a key
issue. Dr. Susan Landau, a Fellow at Harvard University's Radcliffe
Institute for Advanced Study, explained how a similar mandate had
resulted in unauthorized eavesdropping on the Prime Minster of
82 USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
83 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-
261, 122 Stat. 2436 (2008).
84 Industry associations and NGOs released a February 15, 2011 Statement of Concern
about Expansion of CALEA urging cautious appraisal of any such proposal and outlining
several ways in which it could have harmful effects. Statement of Concern about
Expansion of CALEA, CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH. (Feb. 15, 2011), http://ww.cdt.org/
pr statement/statement-concern-about-expansion-calea.
85 Going Dark: Lawful Electronic Surveillance in the Face ofNew Technologies: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 112th Cong. (2011), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/
hearO2172011.html.
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Greece, cabinet ministers, and others. 86 In that case, Vodafone Greece
had purchased switches from Ericeson that were designed with
backdoors to allow interception authorized by law.87 Parties unknown
to this day exploited those backdoors to eavesdrop on government
officials and others.
Alternative approach: Rather than require that communications
applications and services be designed with vulnerabilities that can be
exploited, Congress could support the Domestic Communications
Assistance Center that the FBI is establishing to leverage surveillance
research and development efforts at the federal, state, and local levels.
This would allow all levels of law enforcement to gain the benefit of
surveillance techniques employed by any. It might also help the FBI
enhance its own ability to exploit communications devices themselves.
It also avoids the unintended consequences to innovation, U.S.
competitiveness, and cybersecurity itself that could result from
imposing design mandates to facilitate electronic surveillance of new
communications technologies.
V. CONCLUSION
Washington is awash with cybersecurity policy ideas for Congress
to choose among. Some policies are "low hanging fruit" that should
have been adopted long ago. But others, including those outlined in
this article, could do more harm than good by undermining civil
liberties and necessary information sharing, slowing down decision
making and moving decision-making authority from the best decision
makers, and creating perverse incentives and unexpected economic
and systematic impacts, all of which would undermine cybersecurity.
Picking the right policies will involve careful consideration of options
and the foresight to look beyond promised security benefits to account
for unintended effects.
86 Id. at 23 (statement of Susan Landau, Ph.D., Radcliffe Institute for Advanced Study,
Harvard University).
87 Id.
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